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                        Vinita Damodaran and Richard Grove 
The colonial encounter with the tropics and the global hunt for resources between 
1450 and 1650 under the mercantile capitalism of European  empires transformed 
the natural worlds of the Renaissance leading to a cultural and intellectual 
efflorescence. This was a period when, as the historian Donald Worster puts it, 
‘capitalism became the pioneering, and … most important, architect of that new 
integrated world economy’, the environmental impact of European colonial 
expansion on so much of the world territory  became apparent and humans as 
environmental agents begin to dominate over nature. The idea of a threshold or 
turning point is key to the debate on changing human nature interactions in the 
early modern period and defining that moment is a major problem both in terms 
of the dating and also in terms of a new culture of valuation of the landscape when 
people became aware of the importance of human agency and its possible 
damaging effects.    
         Empires historically have  tended to possess the resource demands, the 
urban needs, the capital and the information networks, command of trade routes 
on land and at sea, enabling them to increase their carrying capacity and further 
augment their command of surpluses by landscape transforming colonisations.  
They also transform the disease environment and create the conditions through 
their urban and network characteristics for periodic mass mortalities during 
extreme climate events, introducing an element of great instability as well as 
transition in populations. The advent of the more seaborne empires in the 
Renaissance beginning with Venice imposed new demands on timber resources, 
for example  in the Balkans as well as novel patterns of forest administration, 
early conservation, resource organisation and classification, analysis of soil  types 
and soil erosion. With the development of sugar, in the fifteenth century,  a step 
change occurred in the speed of landscape transformation in the Mediterranean, 
followed by the East Atlantic, the West Atlantic, the Caribbean, South America 
and finally the South Atlantic. Plantation agriculture and the rapid developments 
of markets in high value sugar and other addictive drugs (tea, coffee, tobacco, 
opium, cocaine) as well as urban foodstuffs from the sixteenth to the eighteenth 
century further, created the conditions for profitable capital investment in the 
commodity frontier(Grove 1995, Richards 2003). We begin to see the 
transformation of the Canaries, Madeira and Cape Verdes, but these are a logical 
development of the colonization and transformation of many of the 
Mediterranean islands especially by the Genoese.   At the same time, one can see 
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the emergence of a nascent environmental consciousness and an emerging culture 
of  ‘environmentalism’ (Grove 1995). 
           For environmental historians, the recent preoccupation with human 
induced climate change designated by some earth system scientists as the 
Anthropocene comes as a surprise as the concept of human-nature interactions 
over time has long been a central object of their study1. Since the 1950s, the 
Annales School had emphasized the importance of geography and climate in 
understanding history over what it called “the longue durée.” Other 
environmental historians followed such as John F Richards, Donald Worster and 
Richard Grove who examined the resource demands of early empires. As the 
eminent historian Worster  noted environmental historians had long recognised 
the cultural history of nature as being as important as the ecological history of 
culture. For Worster, then the purpose of environmental history, was ‘to put 
nature back into historical studies, or, defined more elaborately, to explore the 
ways in which the biophysical world has influenced the course of human history 
and the ways in which people have thought about their natural 
surroundings’(Worster1996). Grove further argued that to understand the 
interactions between the natural environment and social structures over the last 
few millenia in a global frame we need, as a first step, to understand the 
conjuncture between extreme climate events, the dynamics and features of 
empires, and their organised responses to the environment, especially to 
anomalous or unusual events. This does not constitute crude environmental 
determinism but is a recognition of the role that the environment plays in human 
affairs and the cultural response of societies to environmental change. This was a 
view that resulted in the Integrated History and People of the World project 
(IHOPE)  in 2005 when an interdisciplinary group of social scientists, historians, 
sociologists and scientists came together on a project to integrate socio-
environmental interactions over centennial time scales (Contanzas, Graumilch, 
Steffan 2006).  
 
Environmental History and Empire 
 
          It is now an accepted premise that global environmental history must deal 
with capitalism as cornerstone of the world economy. At the same time,’ as John 
Mcneill notes, ‘all global history should take account of local conditions whether 
it is environmental history or any other variety. It requires what natural scientists, 
especially those who work with satellite imagery, call ground truthing’ (Corona 
2008). Environmental history has been described as the interdisciplinary study of 
the relations of culture, technology and nature through time and  as the historically 
documented part of the story of the life and death, not of human individuals but 
of societies and species in terms of their relationship with the world around them. 
Some environmental historians argue from a materialist/structuralist perspective 
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while others argue from a much more cultural perspective. There is some 
disagreement about whether the natural world constitutes any kind of order or 
pattern that we can know and, if it does, whether that order can be apprehended 
by means of science or not. There is also a debate about  what is natural and what 
is not, about whether indigenous people managed the whole environment or only 
some part of it, and how much was wilderness and how much was mythical. There 
are also divergent opinions over the extent to which nature influences human 
affairs, some scholars taking the position of limited environmental determinism, 
and others insisting that culture determines all. As Caroline Ford has argued, 
many of the studies in environmental history stress the blurred aspect of the 
nature-culture divide (Ford 2007). 
 Environmental history seeks to address the absence of nature in many 
forms of historical writing.  In histories of empire, this absence is particularly 
marked considering the fact, as Richard Grove argues, that the development of an 
environmental sensibility among Europeans can be traced to the encounter of 
European travellers, surgeons, naturalists, medical officers and administrators 
with environments of the tropics from 1500 and with the recognition of the 
damage done to these environments by them.  Grove’s work revises this 
‘unnatural history’ of the empire, and indeed the growing domain of 
environmental history has taken root in studies of empire. He argued 
convincingly that from the fifteenth century the global network of trade and travel 
transformed European understandings of nature.  The plethora of information that 
travellers, surgeons and later scientists of the British, Dutch and French empire 
gathered  from the wider world helped them to build up an understanding of the 
fragility of nature. The botanic gardens they established on remote islands such 
as  the Canaries and on St Helena became important centres for scientific 
networking rooted in the knowledge on medicine, climatology and agriculture. 
The process of botanical garden-making in the period of the renaissance was both 
about science and culture underlining the garden as an environmental text and a 
metaphor of mind defining the wellbeing and health of man.  It further signalled 
a new aesthetic valuing of the environment. While the ruling agendas continued 
to be medical and therapeutic, garden making was highly imitative. The pattern 
and influence of the garden in Leiden and Amsterdam exercised organising power 
over the gardens in Paris, Cape, St Vincent and at Calcutta. As Grove notes; ‘The 
garden defined modes of perceiving, assessing and classifying the world in terms 
of a Hippocratic agenda.’(1995:13) Grove’s work voluminously documents and 
convincingly argues for the originality, vitality and effervescence of colonial 
science in the colonies from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries and the new 
cultures of knowledge that made possible the emergence of a truly global 
environmental awareness. It depended on a new empirical knowledge of the scale 
of the world and actual observations of human ability to change the natural 





The Resource Frontier of the Early Modern World 
The extension of what Immanuel Wallerstein has called the capitalist 
“world system” on a global scale between 1200 and 1788 had a critically 
important dimension in terms of resource exploitation (Wallerstein 2011, Abu-
Lughod 2005). During the early modern period, when imperial expansion was 
becoming a characteristic of state building, humans established new links, 
primarily by sea, around the entire world and due to maritime improvements a 
truly global economy emerged. Constitutive of this early modernity was the 
collections of plants, animals, peoples and voyaging (Winterbottom 2016: 5). 
Worster has highlighted the maximising culture of early capitalism in terms of 
consumption patterns and resource use and in the process the destruction and 
transformation of indigenous societies and cultures. European merchants and 
companies found that they could exploit the trade goods, markets, and resources 
of almost every land, in what became an expanding commodity frontier,  the 
“unending frontier” in the title of John Richards important book on the 
environmental history of the early modern world (Richards 2003). According to  
Richards, “increased human mobility encouraged the rapid growth of the ‘’world 
hunt’’... commercial hunters and gatherers killed off species of wild fish, 
mammals and birds as well as trees and bushes whose carcasses possessed value 
in the early modern world economy. Humans voraciously and systematically 
located, extracted, processed, packaged, shipped, priced, sold and consumed wild 
animals in ever greater quantities over ever greater distances”(2003:9). The 
rapidly growing economy put traders in contact with indigenous peoples to 
procure, timber, furs and medicinal plants often with devastating impact on these 
peoples. The world hunt also affected the oceans. After about 1400, fisheries 
extended to an oceanic scale as seals and whales were hunted from pole to pole. 
The world’s northern oceans became hunting grounds exploited at a new scale 
and intensity. New seafaring abilities allowed humans beings an expanded access 
to the resources of the ocean. Mariners outside the Mediterranean ventured 
outside their coastal waters and covered long distances to hunt fish, whales, seals 
and walruses. Western Europe became the primary beneficiary of the capitalist 
world economy controlling interregional maritime trade. Markets centred in that 
region directed the exploitation of natural resources on a world scale (Richards 
2003: 9). As Richards notes, ‘Capital investment moved readily from one world 
region to another. Prices for commodities quoted in the urban centres of the new 
world economy sent signals to producers round the globe. New commodities in 
increasing quantities and variety flowed to world markets. Monetary systems 
based on metallic forms of money-copper, gold and silver-expanded and 
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interlinked in new ways. Aggressive trade, war and settlement challenged and 
shocked isolated and insular local cultures and societies’(2003:1-2).  
The argument presented by John F. Richards and Richard Grove about the 
expanding resource frontier of Europe has also been replicated by other 
environmental historians notably by Alfred Crosby in Ecological Imperialism 
where he argues that the process of imperial expansion, whether in terms of direct 
conquest in what Crosby calls the creation of   neo-Europes in the temperate world 
with the colonization of the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, or through 
indirect disruptions as a consequences of trading patterns and military actions, 
fundamentally changed many ecological processes. The introduction of horses to 
the Americas in 1519 by Spanish conquistadors, the humble potato from the 
Americas to Europe in the 1580s, and rabbits to Australia in the eighteenth 
century transformed the environments of these places (Crosby 2004). This is not 
the first time such changes had altered the planet’s ecology; the emergence of 
agriculture and the domestication of animals has meant that the Holocene, the 
geological period since the last glacial episode, has been a period which saw 
accelerated anthropogenic-induced changes in most places, but the speed and 
scale of change in the last half millennium particularly after 1500 is what is most 
important. But the ecological dimension of such imperialism is what needs much 
more attention than it has received until relatively recently. Crosby focuses 
exclusively on the white settler colonies and omits any discussion of the extensive 
regions of the colonial tropics. When we turn to the tropics we see, for example, 
that almost every part of Africa was gradually drawn into a world economy 
dominated by Europe, between the fifteenth and nineteenth century. The period 
after 1500 which saw the enmeshing of the slave trade and the ivory trade 
capitalised by Europeans and Indian merchants effectively drew Africa into 
global networks of trade and exchange2.     
 
Tropical environmental history is still a growing field. In Grove’s terms, 
the focus on the political and the administrative dimensions of empire has 
occluded the material impacts of colonization on people’s lives, their culture and 
on land, animals, fish, forests and other facets of their ecological contexts. The 
environment has simply been taken for granted until recently when the ecological 
dimension of human history, is once again being worked into the picture. One of 
the first symptoms of the early phases of globalisation was the marginalization, 
enslavement, and then extinction of small indigenous cultures, especially those 
of island peoples; the indigenes of the Canary Islands are a classic example. 
However, it was on uninhabited islands such as St. Helena and Mauritius that the 
full effects of highly capitalized plantations, forest clearance, and import of alien 
animals (especially pigs, goats, and rats) were first observed. The extinction of 
the dodo in Mauritius in the mid seventeenth century made a great impression on 
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contemporary naturalists. The fact that oceanic islands were perceived as highly 
desirable “Edenic” locations in long-running European cultural traditions served 
to emphasize the shock of their manifest and rapid degradation. Moreover, their 
degradation threatened their role as watering and supply stations for company 
ships. In these circumstances, the colonial governments of many small islands 
became environmentalist, if only to ensure their own survival and that of their 
agricultural settlers and slaves (Grove 1995). Grove has examined at some length 
the cultural meanings of the "edenic" both in Europe and the newly discovered 
non-European world from 1600 and  the ways in which British, Dutch and French 
scientists  drew on their knowledge of remote islands to build up an understanding 
of the potential fragility and exhaustability of nature. Concentrating on 
deforestation and the  phenomenon of desiccation they operated within an 
intellectual framework of the renaissance informed by new, dynamic and 
empirically-rooted ideas in medicine, climatology, agriculture and botany. 
Indeed, even before the advent of large continental-based European empires in 
Asia, Africa, and the Americas, the scale of artificially caused environmental 
change was already being realised as European maritime countries started to 
exploit new kinds of natural resources on a global scale. As noted, sugar and other 
crops essential to the new urban markets of Europe were cultivated on small 
islands, especially in the West Indies, Indian Ocean, and East Indies. Settler 
cultivation often took the form of highly intensive industrial agriculture. 
Colonists cleared the rain forest landscapes to grow and process cane sugar and 
plantation grown cane sugar became one of the most valuable export products of 
the early modern world economy. transforming ecosystems and landscapes. The 
search for sugar was matched by other commodities such as timber, fish, wildlife, 
exotic plants. As early as the 1670s, the catastrophic consequences of European 
capital- and labour-intensive activities became clear as the early island colonies 
experienced drought due to the drying up of perennial streams, soil erosion, dust 
storms, and the disappearance of animal and plant species (Grove 1995).    A 
hesitantly emerging global consciousness was one of the most profound 
consequences of the speeded up early modern circulation of peoples. Identifying, 
naming and classifying of climates, minerals, human groups, animals and plants 
originated in the taxonomic impulses of enthusiastic observers3. The new world 
had a strong impact on Renaissance man and ‘discovery’ in a global sense 
transforming their cultural sensibilities and  gave them as Grove notes the 
opportunity to locate Gardens of Eden in an emerging geographical reality with 
oceanic Islands which were the first to be seen as ‘Edenic’. 
Indigenous capital accumulation 
Capitalist accumulation and regional trade developed quite autonomously  
from Europe  in South and East Asia in the early modern period. Here too, major 
transformations of the natural landscape took place under empires whose cultures 
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of consumption and accumulation compared favourably to Europe. Some 
developments, like the deforestation of the Ganga basin , by early Indian empires 
had already been long in progress, but they quickly accelerated after 1400 as 
powerful empires developed. As Pomeranz notes, two dissimilar early modern 
states, the Mughal Empire in India and the Dutch republic in Western Europe, 
successfully powered economies of prodigious productivity (Richards 2003: 24-
26). The Mughal Empire in Asia was an agrarian, not a maritime economy4.  By 
the mid-seventeenth century, with a large centralised empire of sub-continental 
proportions and with over 100 million people, Mughal India and in particular the 
region of Bengal had become a vast granary producing immense surpluses of rice 
and clarified butter. Cheap, abundant food stuffs encouraged rising artisanal 
output as  Bengal’s cotton and silk textiles found a ready and growing market in 
Asia and Europe. By comparison with the Mughal Empire, the Dutch republic 
was small, with a population of 1.9 million living in an area of 42,000 square km. 
Due to a combination of institutional circumstances the Dutch republic came to 
dominate the shipping and commerce of the early modern world. Dutch shipping 
had become the most technically advanced in Europe   and between 1570 and 
1620 Dutch traders cornered the trade in the worldwide rich trades, sugar, furs, 
slaves, precious metals, diamonds, spices and textile developing new links with 
the Caribbean, Brazil, West Africa, Northern Russia and the East Indies (Richards 
2003:24).  The Dutch East India Company became the primary conduit for 
European trade with Japan, South East Asia, China and India.  As great maritime 
powers, the European mercantile empires quickly outstripped its Asian 
competitors. 
For Immanuel Wallerstein the rise of Europe was the result of a unique 
combination of relatively free labour, large and productive urban populations and 
merchants and governments that facilitated long-distance trade and the 
reinvestment of profits. However, Kenneth Pomeranz has argued that there is 
little to suggest that Western Europe had economic advantages either in capital 
stock or institutional advantages in 1600 (Pomeranz 2000). He suggests that 
European domination of Atlantic trade did not make Europe dominant in terms 
of financial profits and capital accumulation but it did relieve the strain on 
Europe’s land, energy and resources. For Pomerantz then, Europe’s overseas 
extraction was a crucial factor leading it out of a world of Malthusian constraints. 
It is not surprising that the great divergence debate emphasises the advantage of 
Western Europe in terms of resource extraction from the colonies. It was this 
advantage that was critical to the different trajectories of growth between Europe 
and Asia, leading to the decline of Asia in economic terms. The historian 
Parthasarthi Prasannan also has put paid to  Smithian, Weberian, and Malthusian 
arguments with regard to the development of capitalism in  Asian societies from 
the 16th century arguing for claim of economic and cultural equivalence with 
Europe in  pre-industrial standards of living, technological capacity, and 
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institutional efficiency. Furthermore like Grove he examines the ways in which 
Western Science was actually global science in which Indian knowledge 
participated from the outset, until British intervention dismantled the court 
patronage that undergirded scientific inquiry (Prasannan 2011). It was 
colonisation of India  and extraction from the seventeenth century that accounted 
for the rise of Britain and the decline of India, not cultural stagnation or  religion. 
 
 
Botanic Gardens and Plant exchange 
When we focus on some case studies of overseas extraction in the context 
of Renaissance-era imperial expansion, the importance of exotic plants cannot be 
underestimated.  Indeed, as noted by David Mackay, the economic importance of 
plant interchange buttressed the philosophy of empire(Mackay 1985)  Between 
1415 and 1487 the Portuguese built on even older patterns of pharmacological 
trade in the Indian Ocean region. The study of networks following long distance 
oceanic trade from fifteenth century demonstrated the shared roots of Indian, 
Middle Eastern and European medicine and the transformation of European 
science by indigenous technical knowledge (Grove 1995). In August 1487 
Bartholomew Dias had traversed the southern tip of Africa and in 1521 
Magellen’s fleet had crossed the Pacific and circumnavigated the globe.  With the 
arrival of Vasco De Gama in Malabar in 1498 the scene was set for a rapid 
exchange of biological and botanical material particularly among Asia, Europe 
and the Caribbean (1995: 24). The joy of discovery of the minutiae of the tropical 
world in late 16th century traveller’s accounts was paralleled by the rise of 
botanical science and natural history in Europe. The rise of botanical gardens in 
renaissance northern Italy in Pisa and Padua was one result of these 
interconnected developments, resulting in the first major book on Asian botany 
by Gracia Da Orta, a Portuguese physician who lived in Goa published in 1563. 
The book was translated into Latin by Charles D Ecluse (Clusius) a Flemish 
doctor and botanist based in Leiden establishing connections between the Dutch 
botanical establishment and India and leading to the diffusion of knowledge 
between South West India and the Leiden botanical garden and resulting in the 
famous Hortus Malabaricus of Van Reede in 1678. Grove has argued that both 
Orta’s text and Van Reede’s texts privileged Malayali Ayurvedic medical 
botanical and zoological knowledge and are based on indigenous knowledge. 
Grove notes the diffusion of medico-botanical knowledge that tended to privilege 
non-brahmanical epistemologies and impose an indigenous logic. By the 
seventeenth century this relationship was changing as  ‘the practices of collecting 
and transplanting plants, gardening and practicing medicine as well as publishing 
natural histories were directly linked to the colonial exploitation of 
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resources’(Winterbottom 2016:115) Surgeons of the East India Company such as 
Samuel Browne and Edward Buckley were embedded in networks that involved 
different European companies, private interests and missionary interests building 
up a lucrative business of buying and supplying drugs. Both of these men, for 
example, spent time looking at Indian practices in Madras and reporting them 
back to their European counterparts in the 1680s. The process of comparison of 
plants was carried out in botanical gardens which became critical to new ways of 
thinking about nature and modes of perceiving, classifying and assessing the 
world, globally and in terms of a Hippocratic agenda (Grove 1995:13, 
Winterbottom 2016:126). The search for materia medica was matched by a surge 
of interests in other crops such as pepper and cardamom. 
As Deepak Kumar argues colonial developments cannot be solely 
understood in terms of politics or trade. There was he notes ‘ a strong cultural 
context to all that was happening on the eve of colonisation…. Formidable Asiatic 
empires from the Ottomans to the Manchus had begun to show signs of  decline. 
The old order was crumbling and the new was yet to emerge and when it did it 
came via new routes and new knowledge’ (Kumar 2015:) By the seventeenth 
century, the Dutch and the Portuguese found themselves embroiled in a war along 
the coastal hinterlands of the Indian Ocean trading world. In 1663, the Dutch 
gained exclusive access to the pepper trading rights on the Malabar Coast through 
a treaty they signed with the Raja of Cochin (Chaudhuri 1985). The Malabar 
Coast shifted from Portuguese to Dutch control and the everyday resources of the 
indigenous people became highly sought after by a European elite. With trading 
houses or factories built by the Dutch, pepper, cinnamon and cardamom trade 
proceeded at a more sophisticated rate. By the end of the 17th century the English 
East India Company's choice for the location of its main factory on the Malabar 
Coast was Tellicherry because of its proximity to the pepper producing areas of 
Kottayam and Randattara.  With the British takeover of the sub-continent a 
number of the territories of the Mughal Empire became British territories 
(Wallerstein 2011, Prasannan 2011: 21-51). Losing its American colonies had 
significantly damaged the British shipping industry. However, in the newly won 
colonies of the Indian Ocean, namely Java and the Malabar Coast, the dense teak 
forests provided an excellent substitute.  By the 1800s, the British Empire’s 
modes of resource use, well developed trading network and factory system, new 
technologies to shorten seafaring travel contributed to the next great epoch in the 
history of globalisation. Richard Tucker, describes Malabar as almost entirely 
domesticated by global capitalism under the most complex system of resource 
extraction which any European empire ever established in the developing world’ 
(Tucker 1989). These new knowledges downgraded  Indian cultural traditions 
and knowledge practices including those of its science which were beginning to 
be condemned as unscientific and primitive with oriental learning being seen as 
belonging to the realm of the senses and imagination. This cultural downgrading 
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of other societies was linked to earlier environmental understandings in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Early Environmental Enquiry and Cultures of Savagery  
Early environmental ideas were driven by the need of empire builders to 
understand and acclimatize themselves to foreign environments. Europeans 
regarded the tropical environment with a mixture of promise and terror. The 
promise, presumed the exuberance of nature in the tropics while the terror derived 
from the high risk of death that European sojourners faced. We have argued, that 
the great expansion of European maritime travel and settlement after 1400 
stimulated new ways of viewing the relationship between man and nature. As 
early as the fifteenth century, the newly discovered islands in the Atlantic the 
Canaries, Madeira were seen as sites of redemption. For Grove, the island 
metaphor of the Renaissance constituted a vital part of the discourse and culture 
of early colonialism. As he noted,  ‘the new world had a strong attraction for 
renaissance man and ‘discovery’ gave an opportunity ‘to locate gardens of Edens, 
Arcadias, Elysian fields and Golden ages in a geographical reality (Grove 1995).  
The new world conceived of in island terms was both desirable for example, as 
reflected in Columbus’s writings in 1492; ‘the songs of the little birds are such 
that one would never desire to part hence’ and redemptive freeing one from  the 
constraints of  European society.  
The reverberations of these imperial mentalities in the realm of Renaissance 
literary and cultural are well known. For Shakespeare, the location of the Tempest 
provided the setting for speculation about the Edenic qualities of the island and 
the vision it offered to create an alternative utopian society. Accounts of a 
shipwreck on the Bermudas prompted Shakespeare to conceive of an island as a 
meeting place between the indigenous inhabitant and the European colonist. The 
Tempest was also a play about the European response to a new physical 
environment well as to an indigenous inhabitant. Caliban was probably inspired 
by Montaigne’s writings which built on real stories of travel.  For Grove, the 
Tempest debated a whole range of social options and the contradiction between 
the projection of Edenic or paradisiacal properties on to the island and the  
empirical complexity of the island in terms of its flora and fauna (Grove 1995:35). 
The Renaissance had promoted a renewed interest in the value and portrayal of 
the natural world, as reflected in the Tempest which focused on allegedly civilised 
Europeans as they attempted to relocate themselves in a ‘wilderness’.  
The Renaissance-era accounts of many of the earliest encounters between 
Europeans and Amerindians contain reactions towards new world peoples that 
implied or more directly offered praise for what was perceived to be their ‘natural’ 
manner of living. Idealised portrayals of Amerindians in these writings reflect the 
varied, and at times conflicting, fables about faraway’ lands and peoples across 
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the sea that shaped the experiences and expectations of late fifteenth century and 
early sixteenth century explorers, missionaries and soldiers who travelled to the 
America (Marshall and Williams 1972).  Imagined visions of distant lands 
occupied by magical creatures, instantiations of mythological ‘wild men’ or 
inhabitants of a golden age who were celebrated in song and poetry seems to have 
helped to create the archive of the idea of the noble savage. Michel de 
Montaigne’s essay ‘Of  Cannibals’ in 1580 drew upon such earlier descriptions 
but set them in the context of an ongoing discourse about the corruption of 
European societies and the superior excellence of nature’s treasures, which 
included for him most of the indigenous inhabitants of the new world who had 
hardly strayed from their original naturalness. Montaigne’s essay is often 
interpreted as an in an ingenious attempt at complicating the idea of savagery, for 
he directly challenges the view that Amerindians are savage in any pejorative 
sense. A proper understanding of the term savage, in his view shows that 
Europeans who have altered themselves and their environments are in fact 
savagely artificial, rather than naturally pure. As Montaigne argues, 
These people are wild (sauvage), just as we call wild (sauvage) the fruits that 
nature has produced by herself and in her normal course; whereas really it is 
those that we have challenged artificially and led astray from the common 
order, that we should rather call wild (sauvage). The former retain alive and 
vigorous their genuine, their most useful and natural, virtues and properties, 
which we have debased in the latter in adapting them to gratify our own 
corrupted taste. 5 
What animates the behaviour of savage peoples given that they lack “culture” as 
understood by Europeans. The role of climate was central to Montaigne’s 
understanding of the role of fortune in helping to bring about and maintain savage 
societies. New world peoples were blessed by an abundance of natural resources. 
‘They live in a country with a very pleasant and temperate climate...they have a 
great abundance of fish and flesh and they eat them with no other artifice than 
cooking’( Montaingne 1685). The infantilisation of new world peoples by noble 
savage writers was meant primarily as an attack upon the decrepitude of European 
civilisation which they generally viewed as well past its prime. For example, John 
Locke would assert with confidence in 1680s ‘that in the beginning all the world 
was America’(Marshall and Williams 1972: 190). 
Shankar Muthu underlines the irony of treating the new world people in 
these accounts as the earliest, least artificial and most natural humans-- the very 
attempt to humanise them or to turn their presumed savagery into a badge of 
honour ultimately cast them as lacking the cultural attributes which would have 
made them human (Muthu 2009). It is important to note that many of these ideas 
and representations in real accounts was reflected in fictional accounts and the 
disillusionment with existing, political, social and religious forms can be seen in 
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the utopian literature in the seventeenth century which described imaginary 
voyages to imaginary lands (Ellingson 2001). Writers often had access to ‘real 
accounts’  due to the extensive voyaging in the period  and the boundary between 
traveller’s fictional accounts and fictional ‘voyages’ was not absolute (Lovejoy 
1936). In Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, a solitary man is able to live a virtuous 
existence and bereft of all mechanical aids and sophistications of civilisation. 
Both Defoe’s Crusoe and Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels made references to 
contemporary  knowledge shown in traveller’s maps. Historical maps were an 
aspect of the new textualism of the Renaissance and as exploration shifted 
attention from the Mediterranean to the Oceanic, historical atlases reflected a 
growing interest in and understanding of cartography (Black 1997:18). 
Understanding the role of climate was part of this quest for new knowledge and 
the links between culture and climate were beginning to be formulated by the 
seventeenth century.  
Early Environmental Legislation 
The empirical observation of the damage caused by European empires resulted in 
a sense of nascent environmental consciousness from a relatively early period. 
From 1500, the European impact on oceanic islands was documented both as 
watering holes for ships and due to the fact that practical survival on oceanic 
islands was difficult.  This encouraged wider questions about the sustainability of 
a confined settlement. Islands soon became symbolic of the explored world and 
encouraged ideas about limited resources and the need for conservation or 
sustainability. These early colonial responses to environmental crisis thus allow 
us to understand global networks of knowledge. 
 Grove argues for example, that the Caribbean and its littoral, along with Bermuda, 
has been a very important area for working out the processes going on in world 
environmental history in the context of European economic expansion and 
globalization in the early modern period. He  has argued for an early transition in 
attitudes to nature that predate eighteenth century debates. Some of the early 
travelers like Columbus had been genuinely sustained by their conviction of the 
locations of discoverable Edens, Indic or otherwise. By the late sixteenth century, 
as we have seen, growing volumes of capital in connection with agricultural, 
urban and proto industrial transitions was transforming the world. By the mid 
seventeenth century colonial plantation investments by European trading 
companies, (Dutch, English and French) were bringing out rates of soil erosion 
and deforestation which were marked and commented on by these early 
naturalists. Indigenous cultures and societies particularly on oceanic islands, such 
as Canaries,  Madeira and  the Caribbean were under attack. 
It is no accident that the earliest writers to comment specifically on rapid 
environmental change in the context of empires were naturalists who were 
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themselves often actors in the process of colonially stimulated environmental 
change. Grove and Damodaran have argued that the early pioneers of an 
environmental critique of the European and American empires depended on 
having an historical perception of rapid rates of ecological change, and access to 
evidence for rapid change (Grove 1995, Grove and Damodaran 2006). Between 
1500 and 1800 the colonial environment presented a different set of problems to 
the early colonialists compared to metropolitan Europe as ecological pressures 
were felt much more catastrophically in the colonial margins. The degradational  
impact of new settlement and plantation agricultures was felt by the early 
colonists. The cultural impetus independent of the economic motive had also 
resulted in the widespread clearing of forests in the Caribbean, to enable these 
landscapes to resemble Europe. The idea of the links between forests, climate and 
disease had also resulted in extensive forest clearance in the Caribbean. The 
ecological deterioration that followed made an impact on European observers 
resulting in environmental enquiry and some early legislation which must be seen 
in the context of an emergent culture of environmental intervention. 
Some of the first comprehensive forest-protection legislation on such colonies 
was introduced after 1620, in Bermuda and a little later in the Caribbean Leeward 
Islands. In Montserrat, the mountain forests of the island were protected from 
felling after 1702 by a rigid ordinance, with the knowledge that unrestricted 
logging caused soil erosion and flooding on lower grounds and in towns (Grove 
1995). The Caribbean islands, with their large settler and slave populations, came 
under sustained ecological pressure at an early date and, as on Mauritius and St. 
Helena, awareness quickly grew of the physical changes and extinctions brought 
about by commercial clearance. As early as 1616, measures had been taken to  
protect the indigenous edible sea birds in Bermuda. By the mid-18th century, over 
fishing and major reductions in catches were taking place around many now 
densely populated islands. Other legislation followed making conservation an 
integral part of colonial landscape control.  
The earliest environmental historians then were these early naturalists and 
scientists of empire. As early as the mid-seventeenth century we find that 
intellectuals and natural philosophers such as Richard Norwood and William 
Sayle in Bermuda,6 Thomas Tryon 7 in Barbados and Edmond Halley and Isaac 
Pyke on St Helena were all already well aware of characteristically high rates of 
soil erosion and deforestation in the colonial tropics, and of the urgent need for 
conservationist intervention especially to protect forests and threatened species 
(Grove 1995: 114). Halley, for his part, made the first accurate estimates of the 
global volume of the oceans and the varying quantities of different elements in 
marine-land-atmosphere cycling over time 8.  On St Helena and Bermuda this 
early conservationism led, by 1715, to the gazetting of the first colonial forest 
reserves and forest protection laws. In the ensuing century, forest-reserve 
legislation responding to fears of deforestation-induced climate change slowly 
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began to spread around the world, especially throughout the French, British, and 
Dutch empires.  
The rise of imperial networks of information from 1500 enabled the emergence 
of a new global environmental awareness as well as the first accurate accounts of 
global change bringing about an early environmentalism which highlight the  
older and far more complex antecedents of contemporary conservationist 
attitudes. The gradual emergence of a complex European epistemology of the 
global environment should be linked to the cultural dynamics and the pervasive 
and creative impact of the tropical and colonial experience that challenged 
European attitudes to nature and transformed the Western and scientific mind 
after 1500. As Grove argues ‘early environmental concerns emerged as a 
corollary and in some senses as a contradiction to the history of the mental and 
material colonisation of the world by Europeans’ (Grove 1995). 
The dynamics of imperial systems are thus central to understanding 
transformations in world environmental history. Equally important to us, as 
historians, as the next section of the paper shows is the need to develop an 
understanding of the conjuncture between extreme climate events, the features of 
empires and their  impacts and organised responses to the environment, especially 
to events such as the seventeenth century crisis.  
 
Climate anomalies, Culture and the Seventeenth Century Crisis 
The seventeenth century crisis and its climatic basis has had significant impact 
on recent historiography. Using new research in climate history, historians such 
as Geoffrey Parker, Richard Grove, David Clingingsmith and Jeffrey Williamson 
have been able assess the  impact of climatic  events on  historical change and 
rebellions in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. For Geoffrey Parker  and 
Sam White there is robust evidence that global cooling occurred in the 
seventeenth century and that it had a dramatic effect on European society, culture 
and historical events in the period (Parker 2013, White 2011) The idea of a global 
crisis is here to stay and the fact that climate formed an integral part of it is 
accepted by these historians. A central premise of these seventeenth century 
historians is that the synchronicity of the many political disorders of mid-
seventeenth century Eurasia was no accident but was dependent on climatic 
factors. The term seventeenth century crisis was first coined by English Marxist 
historian Hobsbawm, in  Past and Present in  in 1954 and later taken up by Trevor 
Roper (Hobsbawm 1954, Roper 1959). Climate, which was mentioned regularly 
by historians of the Annales school, but rarely elsewhere, came to be seen as 
perhaps the most significant driving force behind those upheavals gathered under 
the term 'crisis'.  How do we see the role of climate  versus culture in history and 
how do we avoid crude environmental determinism? By exploring the arguments 
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on the seventeenth century crisis in the context of Mughal India we hope to 
answer some of these questions. 
 
For the longer part of its history, and in the overwhelming majority of texts 
produced that addressed the issue of the seventeenth century, 'General Crisis', the 
focus has been on Europe. In 1975, Jonathan Israel began to extend the 
geographical boundaries of the debate in his work to Mexico and the General 
Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (Israel 1975). Further territorial extension was 
slow to materialise  – suffering no doubt from the general move away from 
structuralist thinking – indeed, it was more than a decade before the Ming / Qing 
transition in China was first considered in this connexion by Frederick Wakeman 
and not until 1990 that a special edition of Modern Asian Studies, presenting four 
articles – all economic histories – on 'The General Crisis in East Asia', introduced 
to General Crisis theory the study of highly developed economies such as Japan, 
Indonesia and India (Wakeman 1986). Contributions to this volume from 
Anthony Reid and William Atwell looked at South East and East Asia respectively, 
John Richards considered the period in Mughal India, while Neils Steensgaard 
discussed 'unity in Eurasian history'.9 Two key communalities can be drawn out 
of this phase of the historiography in which the debate moved into Asia; firstly 
the notion of the Crisis as a fundamental transformation between epochs, era or 
epistemes, between old and new, which dominates the historiography of the crisis 
in Europe faded as identification becomes more a matter of noting the 
coincidence of a sufficient number of negative incidents encompassing a broad 
enough geography and sufficiently diverse areas of human life and secondly; 
climate began to be seen as quite a significant factor in bringing about the crisis  
first highlighted by the Annales school. This section examines the evidence for a 
cooling climate and  the impact of the seventeenth century crisis on India in the 
context of the political, military and administrative culture of the Mughal empire.  
 
The Little Ice Age coincided with a two periods of unusually low sunspot activity, 
the Spörer Minimum (1450–1540) and the Maunder Minimum (1645–1715). 
Both solar minimums coincided with the coldest years of the Little Ice Age 
(LIA) in parts of Europe. In the mid fourteenth century, a combination of violent 
climate oscillation halved Europe’s population and caused severe depopulation in 
Asia. A period of global warming followed and then   a very cold period peaking 
in the mid seventeenth century. Climatologists refer to the period as one of cooler 
average temperature prevailing at the end of the medieval warming to the 
beginning of our contemporary era of global warming. The historian Geoffrey 
Parker, does not engage in this debate he simply appropriates the term to refer to 
the crisis and the Little Ice Age referring to climatic conditions between 1610 and 
the winter of 1708-9. Parker notes that three natural forces combine in this period, 
to generate cooler temperatures and greater climatic variability- reduced solar 
energy being only one of them, increased volcanic activity and a greater 
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frequency of El Niño being the other two (Parker 2013).  
 
For Parker, the period was seen to coincide with ENSO or El Nino Southern 
Oscillation current in the oceans which operates in two distinct phases alternating 
over a period of roughly 2-7 years. These phases are characterised by warming in 
the tropical Pacific and the Indian Ocean, often suppresses rainfall in the western 
Pacific in the case of El Nino and converse in the case of La Nina. ENSO events 
vary widely in their manner of expression, ‘centres of action’ duration and depth, 
but are typically accompanied by extreme weather events. The links of El Nino 
with Asian Monsoon is important here and the structure of Sea surface 
temperatures or SSTs in the Indian Ocean is linked to more familiar pattern of 
SSTs in the Pacific Ocean (Damodaran, Hamilton, Allan, forthcoming). The mid-
seventeenth century saw the weakest period of monsoons on record and in the 
seventeenth century ENSO events happened twice as often.  In fact, the period 
saw the weakest East Asian monsoons of the past two millennia. It was  believed 
that ENSO events also triggered volcanic eruptions and that the global footprint 
of El Nino events included three regions besides the land adjoining the Pacific, 
with the Caribbean suffering floods, Ethiopia and north West India experiencing 
drought and  Europe suffering hard winters. 
The years of the Little Ice Age coincide well with the Mughal Empire in India. 
Parker argued convincingly that 'although Europe and East Asia formed the 
heartland of the General Crisis, the Mughal Empire. . . . also experienced episodes 
of severe political disruption in the mid-seventeenth century' resulting in wide 
spread violence. The Mughal Empire can be seen as having 'come close to 
revolution . . . in the 1650s, while the seventeenth century as a whole is described 
as a period in which wars were fought 'almost continuously' (Parker 2013). 
Droughts, floods and famines, particularly in the late 1620s and early 1630s in 
Gujarat and the Deccan are also cited as examples of upheaval. However, the 
main event by which Parker attempts to bring Mughal India in to the fold of the 
'General Crisis' is the 1658-1662 war of succession. This is interesting as much 
of the violence of the wars of succession should be seen as part of the culture of 
Mughal rule. Parker notes this but puts it down to climate rather than culture and 
politics noting  ‘Yet even this rich empire could not overcome the weaknesses 
caused by ‘bloody tanistry’10 (Parker 2013). The ruthless wars of succession were 
indeed built into the very nature of the Mughal system of power transfer – tanistry 
rather then primogeniture which meant that wars of succession were inevitable 
and, indeed, occurred with every transfer of power in the period. The Mughals in 
the seventeenth century enjoyed exceptionally long reigns – Shah Jahan ruled for 
some thirty years, Aurangzeb for nearer fifty – and serious battles for control of 
the Empire erupted always toward the end of Emperor's lives as their ability to 
assert their authority began to wane as it did in the case of Shah Jahan in the late 
1650s. In the period 1658-62, Mughal wars of succession caused  widespread 
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hardship and death in a ruinous civil war between brothers Aurangzeb and Dara 
Shikoh,  successors of the emperor Shah Jahan. The crisis of succession in 
Mughal India and the movement of the armies coincided with another great 
drought where in Gujerat in 1659, famine and plague once again became apparent 
creating particularly difficult conditions for the Indian  population in the late 
1650s and early 1660s. Contemporary reports noted that 'people [are] dying 
daily . . . the living hardly able to bury the dead' (Agarwal 1983).  
What was the environmental impact of the Mughal empire? Historically the 
Mughals were great tank and canal builders to combat the frequent droughts in 
their empires. The construction and maintenance of reservoirs was encouraged by 
rulers (Hardiman 1998). Their impact on the forests of North India however been 
enormously destructive with increasing agricultural settlement and inroads into 
the forest frontier at frequent intervals (Gommans 2002). Their introduction of 
goats had increased soil erosion and their hunting practices had had a negative 
impact on the wildlife populations of the country. As one writer notes Mughal 
painters recorded with minute accuracy their landscape through their miniature 
paintings, animals, birds plants and hunting practices (Rangarajan and 
Sivaramakrishnan 2012). The emperors all practiced hunting especially Jahangir 
who killed wildlife indiscriminately including tigers and lions. At the same time 
their love of gardens and their penchant for  tree planting was a very significant 
part of  Mughal culture. During his reign, the emperor Akbar encouraged trees of 
every description to be planted resembling the trees of paradise and giving shade 
to tired travellers. 
 
The destruction of forests, the push of the agrarian frontier,  the spread of 
commercial crops and complex systems of tax collection made agricultural 
communities more vulnerable to famine. The Mughal ruler, Akbar’s reign was 
dominated by two major famines in Gujarat in  1556 and 1595 lasting three years. 
Abul Fazl the court historian describing the horrors of this famine noted that the 
mortality was great ‘Man ate their own kin and the streets were blocked with 
corpses’ (Agarwal 1983:24). Abdul Qadit Badauni another contemporary 
historian noted that the whole country was deserted and no husbandmen remained 
to till the ground (Agarwal 1983:23). In 1595 another famine caused by the failure 
of rains affected north India especially Kashmir and Lahore. Jesuit missionaries 
reported that the streets of Lahore were blocked up with human corpses. In 1618-
19 there was famine in the Deccan and on the Coromandal coast. The traveller, 
Methwald who left the East coast in 1622 wrote about the ravages of the famine 
in Vijaynagara. In the reign of Shahjahan, during the protracted La Nina episode 
in 1630-31 a severe famine occurred which affected Golconda, Ahmednagar and 
parts of Malwa. According to Abdul Hamid Lahori, a contemporary historian no 
rainfall in the Mughal territories of the Deccan and Gujerat. The drought was 
followed by severe floods. The middle of the seventeenth century, as noted, had 
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seen the weakest period of monsoons on record and the rains failed in 1646 and 
1647. Heavy mortality, was reported from Pulicat and Madras and the traveller 
William Foster recorded that half the people in the area of Nagapatnam were dead 
and the stench of the dead bodies and the dying people was terrifying. The first 
year  of Aurangzeb's reign was likewise marked by a famine of intense suffering 
causing unspeakable suffering in Northern and Central India. Col Tod noted that 
caste distinctions broke down and that the famine was a great leveller of social 
divisions, ‘there was no longer distinction of caste, Sudra and Brahmin were 
indistinguishable. Men ate men’. Cities were depopulated and  Bihar had a severe 
famine in 1671 which encouraged the slave trade. In 1687 there was another 
severe famine that broke out in Golconda.  June 1687 saw floods and the city of 
Hyderabad was depopulated, houses, rivers and plains filled with corpses. From 
1704-1707 another great famine hit the Deccan but this famine caused by drought 
was not so severe as that during the reign of Shah Jahan. 
On the face of it then, whilst Parker’s interpretation of events in Mughal India as 
being a result of climatic uncertainity can be justified from contemporary 
descriptions Parker's claim of ‘exceptional violence’ in the seventeenth century 
as a whole is  questionable as  argued tanistry and wars of succession were part 
of Mughal politics and culture. Furthermore,  the argument sits in some contrast 
to the historiography, for example, John F. Richards and Irfan Habib and others, 
who have described the seventeenth century as a period of relative calm and 
stability (Richards 1990, Habib 1963). Lack of comparative and contextual data 
on monsoon failure also leaves Parker's argument somewhat open – details of 
how common these were, their geographic extent, how long they lasted, what 
traditional coping mechanisms existed, what social and administrative 
contingencies were in place are needed in order to form any accurate idea of the 
meaning and significance of monsoon failure in general, and of specific droughts 
for Indian society. That Parker can point to near continuous warfare is not in itself 
proof of exceptionalism in a rapidly expanding and militaristic early modern 
empire, which, throughout its existence, failed to define solid boundaries and was 
always involved either in expansion or suppression of rebellion somewhere in its 
vast territory (Edwards and Garrett 1974).  
 
John F. Richards saw no evidence of a seventeenth century crisis in India, 
identifying instead, continuity and prosperity which endured well into the 
following century when the region experienced a distinct and unrelated 
eighteenth century crisis as the Mughal emperors lost power to local lords and 
later the EIC. Richards' conclusions are not very different from those reached 
some thirty years earlier by the distinguished economic historian of early modern 
India, Irfan Habib in his work The Agrarian System of Mughal India. For Habib, 
it was the strength of the Mughal Empire as an administrative unit which was its 
most remarkable feature; the revolt of 1580 and the Rajput revolt a century later 
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being practically the only points at which the elite or the theocracy made any play 
of contesting the power of the semi-divine monarch. Moreover, Habib holds – 
contrary to Parker – that in the light of the refusal of contesting parties to ever 
discuss or consider partition, the wars of succession beginning in 1628, 1658 and 
1707, should be viewed not as moments of weakness or near collapse, but as 
markers of the remarkable durability and cohesion of the Empire (Habib 1963). 
 
Habib, emphasises the stability and security afforded by Mughal military 
supremacy –albeit accompanied by violent suppression and coercion of the 
masses of peasants and workers –  and the extreme – if impermanent – power 
afforded to the Emperor via the Jagirdari system of delegated revenue collection.  
This system rendered the Mansabdars 'completely dependent on the will of the 
Emperor', and allowed for the collection of taxes which reduced the populace to 
bare subsistence, producing enormous and highly concentrated wealth for a small 
elite (Habib 1963:360). The system was, however, fundamentally flawed: 
Multiple layers of delegation in tax collection, the regular relocation of regional 
administrators and a lack of central control over these Zamindars who were seen 
as the primary threat to order in the Empire, left the system open to exploitation 
whereby the masses suffered enormously at the expense of the various layers of 
the elite (Habib 1963: 317-322). In time, some local lords, particularly in 
Hindustan began to rebel against centralised power, refusing to pass on revenue. 
Poor and subjugated elements where dawn to rebellious regions by more tolerable 
and equitable conditions and thus the power of rebellious elements grew (Habib 
1972:366). By the mid-late seventeenth century the Jat, and later the Maratha 
revolts had become a significant threat to Imperial order – they would eventually 
be its undoing – yet these were slowly developing and evolving states of 
confrontation, which spread gradually, slowly eroding centralised power, rather 
than a well-defined crisis prompting its collapse (Habib 1963: 399-346)     
 
For Clingingsmith and Williamson, it was the eighteenth century which witnessed 
the most significant upheavals in India's economic and political structure 
(Clingingsmith and Williamson 2009). Herein, it was seen that the turmoil 
accompanying the dissolution of the Mughal Empire, into a constellation of 
smaller states and their forced regrouping under the EIC, frustrated commerce 
and industry, leading to economic decline. Even here however the notion of crisis, 
and even of economic decline itself remains controversial and is far from settled 
as an historic fact. Work by Bayly, Alam and Marshall  lays emphasis on 
continuity rather and disruption, with Mughal administrative units are seen to 
remain largely intact, pre-existing growth trajectories are maintained and the only 
major change is in the amount of money passed on by local powers to central 
Mughal administration (Clingingsmith and Williamson 2009 :2011). It was, 
furthermore, in the latter part of this era, the years 1700 that 1760, that India 




Parker's extension of the General Crisis to India then is on much shakier ground 
than it was in regard to China where at least upheaval – whatever its cause – is 
beyond contention. In light of the historiographical consensus that the 
seventeenth century was a time of relative calm in the Mughal Empire and that 
major upheaval did not occur until the early-mid eighteenth century the attempts 
to extend the crisis into the subcontinent are considered, at present, in need of 
more evidence. Parker's arguments, in the case of India, appear to be open to 
exactly those criticisms which were levelled at those of Hobsbawm, Trevor-Roper 
and others beyond the 1960s; that levels of upheaval were simply not that 
exceptional and continuity in systems of power was more marked than 
transformation. What makes these weather anomalies different from say a century 
earlier or a century later? Parker asserts that ‘the seventeenth century experienced 
extremes of weather seldom witnessed before or after and never so far 
since’(Parker 2013) In his analysis LIA possesses a decisive agency revealing 
itself in striking weather events that intervened in historical processes influencing 
the outcome of battles, destroying empires. The claim requires comparative and 
quantitative evidence, more detailed work on documentary and paleo sources. 
Furthermore, in terms of climate it is important to note that impacts are always 
asymmetric, simplistic notions such as weak or strong monsoons or intense El 
Niño episodes do no justice for the possibilities of variation in mode of expression 
and centres of action of these climate events. A more useful approach then, is one 
that focuses on regional and national differences  and the resilience of agricultural 
communities and their production strategies in the face of population pressure, 
exogenous shocks and environmental change. Famine causation is complex and 
links between drought and famine needs to be re assessed in the early modern 
period. Despite these caveats, there is a strong need to develop a database with 
that will help us put together a clear famine series, climate series, disease series, 
wage series and price series for South Asia and the Indian Ocean world from 
1500-1900 which is currently woefully inadequate.  
   
   The paper has shown the ways in which history of the early modern imperial 
world can be enriched by these recent trends in historiography in terms of a global 
environmental and climate history.  In brief, early colonialism brought about step 
changes in rates of environmental and landscape change with early island 
plantation agriculture, hunting and fishing and also in terms of environmental 
information collection, storage and transmission. Colonialism of this kind  
enabled new cultural imaginings and the collection of systematic data on oceanic 
islands through the establishment of colonial botanic gardens with the 
employment of scientists as surveyors and naturalists from 1500. By actively 
promoting and enabling the journeys of travellers and artists, European colonial 
empires encouraged the systematic organisation and cultures of natural history 
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and global botany.  By the beginning of the seventeenth century as we have shown, 
this had resulted in some nascent conservation legislation. Studying imperial 
systems is thus central to understanding transformations in world environmental 
history. Equally important to us, as historians, as the second section of the paper 
shows is the need to develop an understanding of the conjuncture between 
extreme climate events, the dynamics of empires, their military and 
administrative cultures and in turn their  environmental impacts and their 
organised responses  to anomalous events such as the seventeenth century crisis.  
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